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THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF RFRA: INTEGRATING
LOPEZ AND BOERNE
John MA. DiPippa"
I. REQUIEM AETERNAM:I THE DEATH OF EXPANSIVE
CONGRESSIONAL POWER
Strictly speaking, a requiem is a funeral mass. The word has come to
signify grief and mourning on a grand scale as exemplified by the musical
compositions bearing the name. It is a clever word to use in connection with
a symposium on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.2 Funerals are cultic
rituals meant to symbolically embody the community's deepest beliefs.
Funerals signify the community's respect for the dead, its care for the living,
and its beliefs about the future. They reenact the deceased's movement from
life to death by remembering the deceased's life, noting her death, and
acknowledging the deceased's and the survivors' uncertain futures. These
rituals help organize the survivors' lives afterwards; that is, they remind the
survivors of their own mortality, their fundamental beliefs, and of the way they
should lead their lives from that day forward.
City ofBoerne v. Flores? is a requiem for expansive congressional power
to define and expand human rights. The opinion remembers the life of this
broad congressional power and marks the death of extreme judicial deference
to congressional authority. It reminds us of some fundamental constitutional
ideas: congressional power is limited and the Supreme Court defines these
limits. The decision orients Congress to these fundamental realities in the (now
uncertain) future by suggesting that Congress establish the factual basis for its
actions more completely and coherently.
The Boerne case puts to rest any congressional claim to a substantive
Section Five4 power.' More important, Boerne modifies the traditional rational
basis standard the court purportedly uses in this area.6 This result is in line with
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. I would like
to thank UALR School of Law Dean Rodney Smith for organizing this symposium and for
encouraging me to participate. I would also like to thank my research assistant, Robin Baldwin,
for her excellent help in preparing this article.
I. Rest Eternal: First words of the Introit in the Latin mass for the Dead, "Requiem
aeternam dona eis, Domine." [Give to them eternal rest, 0 God.] XIII Oxford English
Dictionary 681 (2nd ed. 1989).
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994) [hereinafter
RFRA].
3. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
5. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164-67.
6. See id. at 2169-71.
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the Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 7 which seemed to modify
the rational basis standard in Commerce Clause cases similarly.' These two
cases suggest that the Court will more closely review future congressional
legislation. Both cases call for a more searching review of the congressional
record. Stricter review may spell trouble for some recent and popular
congressional legislation like the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act.9
Nevertheless, even under this tighter standard Congress could enact narrowly
focused variations of RFRA under its Commerce Power.
II. DIES IRAE:" ° THE LIFE AND DEATH OF KATZENBACH V. MORGAN
In Katzenbach v. Morgan," the United States Supreme Court upheld
Congress' use of its Section Five power under the Fourteenth Amendment to
invalidate some English literacy requirements although the court itself had
previously held such requirements constitutional. 2 The Court said that "[I]t
was for Congress ... to assess and weigh the various conflicting consider-
ations . . .. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which
Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."'
' 3
Archibald Cox participated in Morgan as Solicitor General. He wrote that
Morgan "call[ed] attention to a vast untapped reservoir of federal legislative
power to define and promote the constitutional rights of individuals in relation
to state government."' 4 Cox believed that Morgan and South Carolina v.
Katzenbach5 established that Congress had the power to "regulate activities
which do not themselves violate the prohibitions of [the 14th] Amendment,
where the regulation is a rational means of effectuating one of its
prohibitions.', 16 Cox correctly noted that judicial deference was the key to the
7. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
8. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-64.
9. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. 248 (1994).
10. Day of Wrath: first words, and so the name, of a Latin hymn on the Last Judgment.
IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 634 (2d ed. 1989).
11. 384 U.S. 641(1966).
12. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (upholding
the use of literacy tests in the face of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge). The section of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1994), at issue in Morgan,
section 4(e), prohibited states from using English language literacy to deny the right to vote to
people who had been educated in Puerto Rican schools. See 384 U.S. at 643 n. 1.
13. 384 U.S. at 653.
14. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 99 (1966). For a further elaboration of Cox' views see Archibald
Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199 (1971).
15. 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding congressional power to enact various provisions of
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 including the suspension of literacy tests).
16. Cox, supra note 14, at 102.
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development of this principle: "The scope of this principle will naturally
depend upon the extent to which the judicial branch reviews legislative
judgments concerning the relation between the statutory measure and the
constitutional objective."17
Cox analogized Morgan to the post New Deal Commerce Clause cases.
In those cases, the court rejected its prior strict review of congressional
commerce legislation and gave congressional judgment great deference. 8 As
one commentator noted thirty years later, Morgan could have been the New
Deal of civil rights jurisprudence: the beginning of an era of judicial deference
to congressional use of its Civil War Amendments' power.'9
Justice Brennan's opinion20 contained two justifications for upholding
Congressional power. The "remedial" justification argued that outlawing
literacy tests was a way to remedy constitutional violations in the provision of
government services. Ensuring voting power for minorities disenfranchised by
the literacy requirement helped remedy and prevent future constitutional
violations. 2' This justification was relatively non-controversial. After all, its
pedigree extends all the way to McCulloch v. Maryland 2 Its success depended
on the existence of one or more real or potential constitutional violations that
the legislation aimed to remedy or prevent.23 The other justification was more
controversial. Justice Brennan suggested that Congress could prohibit conduct
that it concluded was unconstitutional although the Supreme Court had ruled
otherwise.24 This "Substantive" power did not depend on the existence of
17. Cox, supra note 14, at 103.
18. See Cox, supra note 14, at 105, 107.
19. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695, 718 (1996).
20. See Morgan, 384 U.S. 641.
21. Seeid. at 652-53.
22. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819). Morgan expressly relied on McCulloch's
famous statement: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional .... Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650. Cox noted that the use of this standard had "far-reaching
consequences" because judicial restrictions on congressional actions might be non-existent. See
Cox, supra note 14, at 174. For an argument that the Section Five power is the equivalent of
the Necessary and Proper "power," see G. Sidney Buchanan, Katzenbach V. Morgan and
Congressional Enforcement Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment: a Study in Conceptual
Confusion, 17 Hous. L. REv. 69, 116-117 (1979); see also Donald Francis Donovan, Note,
Toward Limits on Congressional Enforcement Power Under the Civil War Amendments, 34
STAN. L. REv. 453 (1982). Stephen Carter takes the position that 1) the McCulloch language
is not a "test," and 2) the framers of the 14th Amendment rejected the necessary and proper
language. See Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of
Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 819, 827-828 (1986).
23. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652.
24. See id. at 654-55.
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constitutional violations that the court recognized. It gave Congress a
sweeping power to act in spite of the court's contrary holdings.25 It was this
substantive interpretation that earned most of Cox' praise.26
Morgan's promise (or threat depending on your point of view) never
materialized.27 Subsequent Supreme Court cases involving the Civil Rights
Amendments' enforcement clauses seemed to limit, if not reject, the substan-
tive theory.28 At the same time, Commerce Clause developments reduced the
necessity for a broad Section Five power. The Court greatly expanded the
scope of the Commerce Clause while at the same time giving more deference
25. Justice Brennan tried to limit this power to legislation that increased the protection of
civil rights. See 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. This is the so-called ratchet theory. See Douglas
Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REv. 145 (1995). That is, this
substantive power only works when Congress expands rights. It cannot be used to dilute rights.
See id. See also Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the
Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv. 299 (1982) (Substantive
power limited to classifications that the Court will strictly review). But see Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 462 (1994) (Congress empowered to extend and
supplement the work of the Court but not to command Court's acquiescence to congressional
interpretation of Constitution).
Morgan's ratchet theory may have contained the seeds of its own destruction. See
Richard Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 117-118
(The Court will decide whether or not Congress expands or contracts rights. Thus, "Morgan
... appears to confer independent power on Congress with one hand and then not even bother
to switch hands to retake that power .... [T]he Court will set the basic terms. Congress can
only fill in the blanks.").
26. "[T]here seems to be no persuasive reason why the question whether certain action
violates the Fourteenth Amendment should be regarded as necessarily 'judicial' in nature.
Indeed, thejudgment of a representative legislature might be thought especially significant in
interpreting fundamental political rights." Cox, supra note 14, at 172.
27. See Irving A. Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw .U.
L. REv. 656, 657-58 (1977) (Morgan's development seriously arrested by Court's rejection of
its substantive rationale).
28. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), a divided court greatly undermined the
substantive theory. The Court upheld Amendments to the Voting Rights Act that prohibited
literacy tests nationwide using a remedial theory. See id. at 144-47. A different majority
struck down an Amendment that would have set 18 as the voting age for all state elections. See
id. at 118, 124-31. This majority rejected a justification for this provision based on the
substantive theory. Justice Black argued that a broad reading of Morgan would threaten the
independent existence of the states. See id. at 128-29. Chief Justice Burger, joining Justice
Stewart's opinion, looked only to the remedial theory as authority for the 18-year-old vote
provision. The Amendment was not constitutional in the absence of any prior or potential
constitutional violations. See id. at 296. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 260
(1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Congress may act only where a violation lurks."). But see
William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 603, 620 (1975) (Theories of Section 5 that depend on the difference between
substantive interpretation and remedial enforcement are not viable. The only judicially
enforceable limitations are contained in the Bill of Rights, excluding the Tenth Amendment.).
770 [Vol. 20
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to Congress' judgments in commerce cases.2 9 Ironically, Congress could
accomplish many of its Section Five goals by using the commerce power.3"
Two recent Supreme Court decisions undermine this state of affairs. In
City ofBoerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its
Section Five power under the 14th Amendment when it enacted RFRA.3 The
Court declared that the legislative record could not support a remedy so broad
as RFRA. In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the
Commerce Clause did not allow Congress to prohibit the possession of a
firearm within 1000 feet of a school.32 Congress made no findings of interstate
effect and the opinion rejected the government's post hoc attempts to show
such effect.
33
Boerne and Lopez may be part of a renewed effort by the Supreme Court
to engage in meaningful review of congressional action. Under this form of
review, the Court takes a close look at the actual legislative record to see if it
supports the claimed purpose and the chosen means. The lower courts have not
uniformly followed the Supreme Court's lead, however. Some lower courts
still use a pre-Lopez style of review, deferring to thin and artificial arguments
about the connections to interstate commerce. Boerne sends another message
that the days of absolute judicial deference are over. When combined with
Lopez, a good deal of contemporary legislation may be in jeopardy.
29. See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990) (stating that
National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (1994), converting
unused rail rights-of-way to recreational trails valid exercise of Commerce Power because
Congress could encourage the development of additional recreational trails. Court was not at
liberty to invalidate act because other methods might serve the Congressional purposes more
directly.) See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994),
did not violate the Commerce Clause when there is "any rational basis" for congressional
finding that activity affects interstate commerce). Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)
(arguing that impact of individual case on commerce not important when rational basis exists
for conclusion that general category affects commerce).
30. For example, Fourteenth Amendment precedent precluded the use of the Section Five
power to prohibit private racial discriminations in places of public accommodation. See The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1875) (explaining that public accommodations provisions of
Civil Rights Act of 1875 exceed Congress' Section Five power). Nevertheless, the court upheld
Congress' use of the Commerce Clause to outlaw private racial discrimination in public
accommodations. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(Private discrimination in public accommodations has harmful effect on interstate commerce);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Congress had a rational basis to conclude that
private racial discrimination in restaurants adversely affected interstate commerce); EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding application of Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, to state employees).
31. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157.
32. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
33. See id. at 563.
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III. OFFERTORIUM: CITY OF BOERNE AND THE DEATH OF A
SUBSTANTIVE SECTION FIVE POWER
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the United States Supreme Court held that
Congress exceeded its authority under Section Five of the 14th Amendment
when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).3 ' The Court
noted that the Section Five power only extended to "enforcing" the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, "[1]egislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing" the
Fourteenth Amendment.35
The court must be ready to declare Congressional action unconstitutional
when it strays from remedy to substance:
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law
is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining
where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be
a congruence and a proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection,
legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.36
The court concluded that both the history of the 14th Amendment and its
prior cases limited Congress to enforcing but not defining the 14th Amend-
ment.37 The court could find no principled limitation on Congressional power
if Congress could define the scope of its Section Five power by defining or
redefining the substantive scope of the 14th Amendment.3" The court rejected
the suggestion that Morgan supported a substantive Section Five power.
Instead, the court limited Morgan to situations where the chosen remedy is a
reasonable means to prevent clearly unconstitutional governmental action.39
Compare how the court considered the legislative record in both Morgan
and Boerne. In Morgan, the court deferred to the Congressional judgment on
remedial matters. The court simply required "some basis" for Congressional
34. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2157. City authorities in Boerne, Texas, acting
under a local historic preservation ordinance denied a building permit to enlarge a church.
Archbishop P. F. Flores challenged the denial by claiming that it violated RFRA. The district
court declared RFRA unconstitutional but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. See 73
F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996). For additional academic commentary on RFRA, see The James R.
Browning Symposiumfor 1994: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REv. 5
(1995).
35. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at2164.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 2164-68.




action, even speculating about the underlying basis when the Congressional
record did not express it.40 The court relied on evidence of the motives of the
framers of the New York literacy requirement that, at the time of Morgan, was
more than forty years old.4' Moreover, the court clearly speculated on the
possible Congressional motives for the particular provision at issue.42 The
court was exceptionally generous in reading the remarks in the Congressional
record to support the constitutionality of the act.43
Archibald Cox noted this deference in his commentary on Morgan. He
argued that the "dominant theme" of Morgan was drawn from the court's
modem Commerce Clause cases:
The Court should defer to the Congressional judgment ... in reviewing
legislation enacted under Section Five [and] will eschew reviewing
legislative judgments upon the relation of means to ends and like questions
of proportion and degree."
Cox noted that phrases like "reasonable relation" and "rational" were
absent from the Morgan opinion.45 Morgan held that the Court would uphold
the law if it "may be viewed" as a measure to enforce the 14th Amendment and
if the court could "perceive a basis" upon which Congress could base this
judgement.46 To Cox, this language was not accidental. It represented the
40. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654-56. The court concluded that the English language
requirement may have been motivated by racial or ethnic prejudice. See id. at 654. It referred
to the following statement at the state constitutional convention that considered adopting the
English literacy requirement: "[T]he mental qualities of our race... are exposed to a single
danger, and that is that by constantly changing our voting citizenship through the wholesale but
-valuable and necessary infusion of Southern and Eastern European races .... The danger has
begun .... We should check it." Id. at 654 n. 14 (citing III New York State Constitutional
Convention 3012 (Rev. Record 1916)). The Court simply concluded that Congress was "aware
of that evidence." See id.
41. See id.
42.. The Court said that "Congress might have" believed that banning literacy requirements
would advance important goals. See id. at 654. It is not clear that Congress ever actually
believed such things. The act was part of broad based attack on "tests and devices" and the
provision at issue in Morgan was only a small part of it, In fact, the measure was introduced
from the floor by members of the New York Congressional delegation. Consequently, there
were no committee hearings or findings in regard to this section. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 669
n.9 (Harlan, J. dissenting). Its passage may simply have been a favor to members of a state
delegation who stood to gain the votes of the newly enfranchised voters. See also Burt, supra
note 25, at 108-09 (stating that senators were more interested in total number of registered
voters if large number of newly registered voters are likely to vote for that Senator).
43. The Court even supplements this record with its own research, and statements from
the lower court. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652 n.ll, 15, & 16.
44. Cox, supra note 14, at 104.
45. See Cox, supra note 14, at 104.
46. See Cox, supra note 14, at 104.
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court's determination to uphold Section Five legislation "without judging the
substantiality of its relation to a permissible federal objective.,
47
Cox concluded that "[i]mplicit in this reasoning is the proposition that the
basis for the congressional determination need not appear in the legislative
record. 48 He accepted Justice Harlan's statement in dissent that there was
"simply no legislative record supporting" Justice Brennan's hypothesized
discrimination.49 Cox argued that Justice Harlan was wrong, however, when
he claimed that some legislative record supporting the extension of the Section
Five power was necessary. Instead, the Court had never required a record.
This reflected "the fact that the fundamental basis for legislative action is the
knowledge, experience, and judgment of the people's representatives only a
small part, or even none, of which may come from the hearings and reports of
committees or debates on the floor."50 The Court should assume the existence
of facts supporting the Congressional judgment unless "rationally impossible"
even if that judgment is at odds with the Court's own determination of
constitutionality.5
In Boerne, the Court reviewed the legislation with a more careful eye.
Bishop Flores argued that RFRA, like the literacy test upheld in Morgan, was
a measure designed to prevent and remedy constitutional violations. RFRA
represented Congress' judgment that it would be too difficult for plaintiffs to
prove intentional discrimination in many cases. Reviving the Sherbert!Yoder
test52 was a reasonable means to enforce the guarantees of the 14th Amend-
ment 3 The success of this claim, as Cox pointed out in his commentary on
Morgan, depends on the extent to which the Court will defer to Congressional
judgment.54 In Boerne, the court gives Congress little deference. 5 First, the
47. Cox, supra note 14, at 104.
48. Cox, supra note 14, at 104.
49. See Cox, supra note 14, at 104-05 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 669 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). See also Carter, supra note 22, at 841 (stating that Morgan was not based on
congressional facts because "[t]here weren't any!").
50. Cox, supra note 14, at 105.
51. See Cox, supra note 14, at 106-07.
52. Balancing test discussed in Boerne, whose abandonment by the Court prompted the
passage of RFRA. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160-62.
53. See id. at 2162-63. See also Laycock, supra note 25, at 166; Douglas Laycock, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REv. 221, 245-52 (1993); Thomas C. Berg,
What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1, 62-68 (1994).
54. See Cox, supra note 14, at 104-05. See also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97(1979).
("The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention
is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.").
55. The Court noted that "U]udicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of
the legislative record Congress compiles but 'on due regard for the decision of the body
[Vol. 20
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Court assessed the congruence between the "means used and the ends to be
achieved. 56 The court discounted the legislative record because it lacked
"examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry." 57 The evidence of religious persecution produced at the
hearings was at least forty years old.58 More recent evidence consisted of
"anecdotal evidence" of laws of general applicability that burdened religious
practices.59 These were not examples of laws "enacted or enforced due to
animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices or that they indicate
some widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this country."'
Congress' concern was not with intentional discrimination but, rather, with
laws that incidentally burdened religion. RFRA's revival of the compelling
interest remedy was not congruent with the purported goals of the legislation.
Second, the court concluded that RFRA was out of proportion to any
supposed constitutional violations. Courts could not confine RFRA to cases
where the laws in question would be unconstitutional. The scanty legislative
record was not "RFRA's most serious shortcoming," however:
61
Regardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be consid-
ered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any
meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.62
RFRA applied to all levels of state and federal government though the
Congressional record contained little evidence that governments were
pervasively discriminating against religion. In all of the Voting Rights Act
constitutionally appointed to decide .... As a general matter, it is for Congress to determine
the method by which it will reach a decision." See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. This statement
came between the sections of the opinion where the Court declared that the legislative record
failed to support RFRA because there was no evidence of contemporary discrimination and that
Congress was more concerned with remedying burdens on religion by otherwise constitutional
state laws. It is hard to credit this claim of deference when the court critiques both the quality
of the record and the motivations of Congress. See id. at 2169-70.
56. Boerne, 117 S, Ct. at 2169. The Court noted that the "appropriateness of remedial
measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.... Strong measures appropriate to









cases,63 Congress acted upon a legislative record which established the
existence of widespread or pervasive intentional discrimination. 64
This broad scope of RFRA further distinguished it from the Voting Rights
Act. The Voting Rights Act affected a particular class of laws and only applied
to areas of the country where intentional racial discrimination had been most
virulent.65 In cases like Morgan, Congress aimed the law's remedies at a
particular device historically used to deny voting rights.' Finally, the voting
rights provisions had a time limit. Although not all Section Five legislation
requires "termination dates, geographic restrictions or egregious predicates..
." these things help ".... ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends
legitimate under Section Five., 67 RFRA had none of these limitations.
The Court's conclusions as to congruence and proportionality stem from
its rejection of the congressional record. Unlike Morgan, the Court did not
presume the existence of facts to support congressional enactment of RFRA.
Instead, it carefully scrutinized the actual record to conclude that the evidence
of constitutional violations either was too old or too scanty. Unlike Morgan,
the Boerne court did not allow any speculation about what Congress "might
have" believed nor did it use conventional rational basis analysis. 68 For
example, Congress heard testimony concerning the burdens placed on religion
by generally applicable laws.69 If the court were deferring to the congressional
63. In these cases the Court upheld various sections of the Voting Rights Act when there
was evidence that state and local governments were acting in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966). Several of the sections
contradicted Supreme Court decisions. For example, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980), the Supreme Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment requires proof of intentional
discrimination. Nevertheless, the court upheld a provision of the Voting Rights Act that
required preclearance of practices that had a disparate impact on racial minorities in City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). In that case the Court concluded that Congress
had a rational basis to believe jurisdictions with histories of intentional racial discrimination
continued to pose a "risk of purposeful discrimination." Id. at 177. Therefore, Congress could
require these jurisdictions to preclear all changes that had any disparate racial impact. See id.
64. See, e.g., City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-81 (relying on the significant disparity
between the number of African-American citizens and the number of registered African-
American voters and elected African-American officials); Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 (relying
on the "voluminous legislative history" documenting the "unremitting and ingenious defiance
of the Constitution" by the covered states).
65. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993). ("In areas
of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines
nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification.").
69. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. Boerne cites seven statements in House and Senate
Records on autopsies and eight statements in House and Senate Records on zoning regulations.
[Vol. 20
RFRA
judgment, it could easily have concluded that these examples showed how easy
it might be to hide an unconstitutionally discriminatory motive. Therefore, a
rational legislator could have believed RFRA to be a necessary remedial
measure.
70
More remarkable, however, was the way the Court used the legislative
record against Congress. 71 The actual congressional record doomed RFRA
because it showed that Congress was not interested in remedying or preventing
constitutional violations. The Court concluded that the actual record showed
that Congress was more interested in undoing the Smith72 test.73 While Morgan
had always been a controversial decision, subsequent cases did not suggest that
the court would use the congressional record against Congress to strike down
a law.
74
Boerne may be an anomaly. The Court may confine its more searching
congruence and proportionality review to the unique circumstances of RFRA.
On the other hand, if the Court does not confine the test to these circumstances,
then it may be about to embark on an era of much more active and significant
review of congressional legislation. This review calls into question Cox'
conclusion that the court is "committed to the presumption that facts exist
70. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (rational-basis review does not require
"that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or
rationale supporting its classification").
71. Compare Boerne with FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315, where
the Court noted that
because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute,
it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for
the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.... Thus, the absence
of 'legislative facts' ... has no significance in rational-basis analysis.... In other
words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based
on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.
Id.
72. This test, which replaced the Sherbert/Yoder test in Free Exercise cases, holds that
neutral laws of general applicability, which incidentally burdens a person's religion, will be
enforced.
73. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. The Court noted that the evidence was anecdotal but
most evidence of this kind will be anecdotal. The Court did not mean to imply that the
legislative record must be filled with scientifically adequate evidence but its choice of words
is significant. It suggests that the Court was skeptical both of the claimed legal theory and the
record. Indeed, it is tautology: there is no recent evidence of discrimination and the recent
evidence of undue burdens is "anecdotal" and, therefore, suspect. See id.
74. In City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-81, the Court used the Congressional record to justify
the 1975 extension of the Voting Rights Act. The city argued that the evidence did not support
the extension in light of the progress in minority voting strength. See id. at 180. Nevertheless,
the Court did not measure the act against the problems identified in the record. Rather, it
accepted Congress' statement that the act was necessary to protect minority voting gains. See




which sustain congressional legislation and... to deference to Congressional
judgment upon questions of degree and proportion."75 The Court has signaled
a determination to more closely review congressional actions similarly in other
areas. The most important decision is United States v. Lopez.76
IV. OFFERTORIUM: LOPEZ, RATIONAL BASIS, AND THE
REVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that Congress could-not
use the commerce power to outlaw the mere possession of a firearm in a school
zone. 7 Possession of a firearm was not an activity that "[arose out of or was]
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce."' 8 The Court agreed that it did not
require that Congress make formal findings. Congressional findings in close
cases, like Lopez, would help the Court to evaluate the interstate effect of the
regulated activity. 79 The Court then rejected the government's argument that
violent crime substantially affected interstate commerce by raising insurance
costs, reducing interstate travel, and weakening education thereby leading to
less productive citizens.80 According to the Court, accepting this argument
would allow Congress to regulate any activity under the guise of its commerce
power.8
Lopez suggested that the Court would defer to most Congressional claims
under the commerce power if the activity being regulated was economic. Thus,
75. Cox, supra note 14, at 107.
76. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
77. See id. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 prohibited the knowing possession
of a firearm in a school zone. See 18 U. S.C. § 922 (q)(l)(A) (1988). The Act defined a
"school zone" to include an area within a distance of 1,000 feet from the school grounds as well
as the grounds themselves. See 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(25) (1988).
78. Lopez, 514 U. S. at 561.
79. The Fifth Circuit opinion expressly relied on the lack of findings to strike down the
law. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363-64 (5th Cir. 1993). The Fifth Circuit
concluded that federal courts should defer to Congress when formal or informal findings
provided any rational basis for the regulation. See id. at 1363. The absence of findings
supporting the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 failed to provide any basis to evaluate
whether or not the regulation affected commerce. See id. at 1364. Moreover, it failed to show
that Congress had "consciously fixed, as opposed to simply disregarded, the boundary line
between the commerce power and the reserved powers of the states. Indeed, as in this case,
there is no substantial indication that the commerce power was even invoked." Id. at 1364.
80. The Court termed these the "cost of crime" and "national productivity" arguments.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
81. The Court would "have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States." Id. at 567.
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even the home-grown wheat in Wickard v. Filburn"2 fell within the commerce
power. Consuming the wheat at home was an economic choice to forego
purchases in the open market.
83
On the other hand, the Court will more closely review claims when the
activity being regulated is non-economic. It is on this point that Justice
Kennedy joined by Justice O'Connor concurred. Justice Kennedy described
Lopez as a limited holding. Neither the defendant nor the conduct had a
commercial character and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute had
an evident commercial nexus.84
The issue that divided the justices was how much to credit Congress'
judgment that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion announces the substantiality test but then proceeds
to ignore it. 5 A standard application of the rational basis test would have
allowed the court to uphold the statute even without Congressional findings.
86
Yet, the Chief Justice did not defer to the fictional rational legislator. Instead,
82. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
83. See id. at 128.
84. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's opinion is
a mini-lecture on federalism. He recognized that a judicial role in enforcing limits on the
commerce power was fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, judicial intervention is required
when a statute "upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional
assertion of the commerce power.. .. " Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This is a circular
proposition, however, because deciding that something upsets the federal balance is the same
as declaring it unconstitutional. In the end, Justice Kennedy rests on the factual failure: "Absent
a stronger connection or identification with the commercial concerns that are central to the
Commerce Clause, [the statute] contradicts the federal balance the Framers designed and that
this Court is obligated to enforce." Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's
concerns for the proper role of the court in a government of limited powers also animated his
opinion in Boerne. Once again, however, his conclusion rested on his assessment of the failure
of the facts in the congressional record to justify the exercise of congressional power.
Justice Thomas also concurred but he would perform more radical surgery on the
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. He argued that the substantiality test should be abandoned
and replaced with a standard that more accurately reflected the text and history of the
Commerce Clause. See id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
85. See Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L .REv. 643, 647
(1996) (stating that Lopez is a significant decision because "at a crucial point, it abandon[s]"
the substantial effects test). Nagel suggests that a strict application of Lopez would have
required the Court to invalidate the provisions of the Civil Rights Act at issue in McClung. See
id. Nevertheless, he concludes that "what we are witnessing is an aspect of normal, predictable
doctrinal gyrations, not the beginning of a significant political transformation." Id. at 648.
86. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Will the Real Alfonso Lopez Please Stand Up: A Reply to
Professor Nagel, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 671, 679 (1996) (noting if ordinary rational basis
test was applied, then Justice Breyer's dissent would have been the majority opinion). See also
Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
167 (1996) where Professor Epstein argues that Lopez constitutes a step back from rational basis
review toward something resembling intermediate scrutiny.
1998]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
he imposed a categorical requirement--that the regulated activity be economic
in nature-as a precondition to the application of rational basis.
8 7
Compare the majority opinion on this point to Justice Breyer and Justice
Souter's dissents. Justice Breyer's dissent is a kind of Brandeis brief showing
the economic effects of gun possession on education and, consequently, on
commerce.88 For Justice Breyer, the Court should accept the government's
arguments about the economic effects of gun possession unless they are
irrational.89 Breyer's opinion falls squarely within the post New Deal practice
of deferring to the Congressional factual judgments. Justice Souter's dissent
discusses the application of the rational basis test.90 For Justice Souter, the
rational basis test has no preconditions. If any rational basis exists (in the
weakest sense) for the conclusion that gun possession affects interstate
commerce, then the court is obligated to uphold Congressional action.9
Moreover, Justice Souter saw no reason to make the degree of review vary by
87. Justice Kennedy also adopts this position by suggesting that rational basis review does
not apply absent some commercial character or nexus. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy,
J. concurring). See also Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to
Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 217, 238 (1996).
88. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's dissent. Justice Breyer's opinion contained a great deal of
empirical evidence to show the connection between gun possession, school violence, and
interstate commerce. He concluded that upholding the statute "would recognize that, in today's
economic world, gun-related violence near the classroom makes a significant difference to our
economic, as well as our social, well-being." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer made three general criticisms of the majority opinion in addition to his
empirical argument. First, he believes that the holding is at odds with prior cases upholding
Congressional actions with much less of a connection to interstate commerce. See id. at 625
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Second, he claims that the majority opinion improperly distinguished
between commercial and non-commercial activity. See id. at 627 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This
resurrects the flawed commerce/manufacturing distinction and misconstrued cases like Perez.
In any event, it placed schools on the wrong side of the commercial/non-commercial line.
Finally, the decision threatens legal uncertainty in a previously settled area of law. See id. at
630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 617 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer argued that courts must allow Congress
"a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce ..... Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
90. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. "The only question is whether the legislative judgment is within the realm of reason
.... [T]hose attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to
negative every conceivable basis which might support it .... [I]t is entirely irrelevant for
constitutional purposes whether the . . . challenged distinction actually motivated the
legislature." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 613 (Souter, J. dissenting). Interestingly, Justices Breyer and
Souter dissented in Boerne but neither joined the part of Justice O'Connor's opinion which
concluded that if Smith is the correct standard, then Congress exceeded its constitutional
authority under Section Five. This is consistent with their views expressed in Lopez on judicial
deference to congressional decisions and the application of the rational basis test.
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the nature of the subject.92 If the activity being regulated falls within the
congressional power, it does not matter if it has been ordinarily reserved to the
states. The issue involves congressional power and does not involve state
sovereignty. 9' Consequently, the existence or nonexistence of congressional
findings should have no basis on the standard of review or the validity of the
exercise of power.94
Lopez was the first case in more than 60 years in which the court struck
down congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. 95 After the New
Deal, the Court seemed to embark on a course where clever lawyers could
bring almost everything within the ambit of the Commerce Clause.96 Thus,
Lopez stands in sharp contrast to this "valley of deference." 97 Cautionary
voices existed during this time, however. Justice Stewart noted in dissent that:
92. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. Cf Tom Stacy, What's Wrong With Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 243 (1996) (Federalism
is better served by national political process rather than Lopez' doctrinal concepts).
94.
The question for the courts, as all agree, is not whether as a predicate to legislation
Congress in fact found that a particular activity affects interstate commerce. The
legislation implies such finding, and there is no reason to entertain claims that
Congress acted ultra vires intentionally. Nor is the question whether Congress was
correct in so finding. The only question is whether the legislative judgment is
within the realm of reason.... Congressional findings do not, however, directly
address the question of reasonableness; they tell us what Congress actually has
found, not what it could rationally find. If, indeed, the Court were to make the
existence of explicit congressional findings dispositive in some close or difficult
cases something other than rationality review would be afoot.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting).
95. The last cases to do so were A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S.
495 (1935) and Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) where the Court struck down
wage and hour regulations of employees engaged in intrastate operations. In 1937, the Court
upheld the National Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937), marking the apparent end of active judicial review of Commerce Clause cases. For
discussions of the development of Commerce Clause law, see Barry Cushman, A Stream of
Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 105 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power,
73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987); Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. REv. 645 (1946); Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946 Part Two, 59 HARV. L. REv. 883 (1946); Robert L.
Stem, The Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (1934).
96. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 685, 686 (1996) [hereinafter Fuzzy Logic] where Merritt shows how "[e]ven wearing
moccasins in the privacy of my own home is interstate commerce. Wearing moccasins, after
all, is related to the demand of moccasins ...."; Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 674 (1995) [hereinafter Commerce] ("When I graduated from law school in 1980, my
classmates and I believed that Congress could regulate any act--no matter how local---under
the Commerce Clause.")
97. See Frickey, supra note 19, at 702.
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it is not enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for all
crime is a national problem. It is not enough to say that some loan
sharking has interstate characteristics, for any crime can have an interstate
setting. And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse impact on
interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for interstate business
suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the
streets.9"
Chief Justice Rehnquist presaged his Lopez opinion in a 1980 concurring
opinion. He noted that "one of the greatest fictions of federal system is that the
Congress exercises only those powers delegated to it while the remainder is
reserved to the States or to the people. The manner in which this Court has
construed the Commerce Clause amply illustrates the extent of this fiction.""
It would be a mistake, he argued, "to conclude that Congress' power to regulate
pursuant to the Commerce Clause is unlimited."'" Some activities are simply
too local to be considered part of interstate commerce and some people or
activities may not have any real connection to interstate commerce.'01 He then
introduced the substantiality test saying: "Our cases have consistently held that
the regulated activity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Moreover, simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. ' °2
These concems manifested themselves in Lopez. After Lopez, Congress
is entitled to little deference if it attempts to regulate an activity that is neither
commercial nor connected to interstate commerce. This is not a factual matter;
it is jurisdictional. 0 3  Thus, not only the legal conclusion but also the
congressional facts supporting this conclusion are subject to judicial scrutiny.
Congress may no longer simply assert an interstate connection. It must now
prove it.
98. Perez, 402 U. S. at 157-58.
99. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 307
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 310 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
101. See id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 310-11 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
103. "Congress' findings must be supported by a 'rational basis' and are reviewable by the
courts.... In short, unlike the reserved police power of the States which are plenary unless
challenged as violating some specific provision of the Constitution, the connection with
interstate commerce is itself a jurisdictional prerequisite for any substantive legislation by
Congress under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 311 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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V. SANCTUS: A PRINCIPLED RECONCILIATION OF LOPEZ AND BOERNE
Some commentators argue that Lopez will have little substantive impact."°
Other commentators suggest that Lopez was simply a warning to Congress.105
Under this view, Lopez is a reminder to Congress that the Court is watching
and will periodically assert its power.'""
Philip Frickey has argued that Lopez may be a plausible technique to
encourage better congressional procedures. 0 7 Whether or not we can defend
Lopez as a principled decision promoting legislative attention to important but
often undervalued interests will depend on the extent to which its holding will
apply to individual rights cases.'0 8
Lopez might result in a reordering of congressional power... and the
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. At a minimum, . . . a
prudent Congress might wish to follow the [City of Rome] model when
exercising its commerce power: articulate the judicial standard... and then
document the satisfaction of that standard through facts developed in
hearings and other legislative methods."'
104. See Merritt (Commerce), supra note 96, at 676 (Lopez is "an important, but limited,
rein on congressional power."); McAllister, supra note 87, at 219 (Lopez does not work "any
revolutionary curtailment of congressional power."); Nagel, supra note 85, at 648 ( Lopez is the
result of "predictable doctrinal gyrations."); Durchslag, supra note 86, at 672 (Lopez Court
repackaged "a test that it has recited in virtually every Commerce Clause case decided since
1937."); Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States'Rights Movement
Within the Supreme Court"?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 664 (1996) (Lopez is a "very
narrow decision."); Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 13, 34 (1995)
(Lopez an example of "adjudication precisely in the ordinary course"). But see Steven G.
Calebresi "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: "In Defense of United States v.
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995) (Lopez was "revolutionary").
105. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554 (1995) (Lopez caught
Congress's attention but not likely to make major change in Court's approach.); Merritt, Fuzzy
Logic, supra note 96 at 689 (Lopez reminds us that the Constitution imposes some limits on
congressional power.). Cf Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution For Anyway? Of History and
Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 885, 885-86 (1996)
(Debate about Lopez not about what it really "means; it is about what 'we should make it mean
or do."'). See generally PHILLIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: A THEORY OF THE
CONsTrurnON 191, 195 (1982) ("Court decisions sometimes "cue" Congress to reconsider the
constitutionality of its actions.").
106. See Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political
Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES.. L. REV. 757, 771 (1996) (stating that
Lopez has a "gentle in terrorem effect" on congressional procedures.); Cf Raoul Berger,
Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695 (1996) (stating that Lopez
might bring back original meaning of Commerce Clause.).
107. See Frickey, supra note 19.
108. See Frickey, supra note 19, at 697-98.
109. Frickey, supra note 19, at 719-20.
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Frickey discusses this as "heightened rationality" review.'° As in Boerne,
however, it seems more like a precursor to standard rationality review. That
is, the court first scrutinizes the legislative record to learn the actual end being
sought and whether facts support the choice of the particular remedy. If the
law meets these two conditions, the court defers to the legislative judgment.
If not, the court declares the law unconstitutional for exceeding the scope of
legislative power.
Both Lopez and Boerne follow this pattern. In Lopez, the "trigger" is
whether or not the matter being regulated is economic in nature. In Boerne, the
"trigger" is whether or not the action "enforces" the 14th Amendment. If the
statute meets this threshold, the court applies conventional rational basis
review. If the statute does not meet the threshold, the statute will likely fail.
The Court will use the legislative record to decide whether the statute triggers
rational review.
In both cases the Court asked whether the underlying record supported the
arguments that the statutes fell within congressional power. In Lopez, the court
had no congressional record on which to make that judgment. Such findings
would have been "helpful" to decide whether the act fell within the commerce
power."' In Boerne, a congressional record existed. These findings did not
prove "helpful" to the legislation, however. Instead, the Court used the content
of the record to rule against RFRA's constitutionality. The Court required that
Congress' choice of means be congruent with and proportional to a proper
constitutional goal. The Court measured congruence and proportionality
against the actual record before Congress. In this context, the Court's
insistence that the existence of a legislative record is immaterial sounds hollow.
In fact, the Court may be silently following its Lopez method.
Just as the Court seemed to extend its Lopez scrutiny to the Section Five
power, it should similarly extend its Section Five standard to Commerce Clause
cases. Congruence and proportionality give some content to the rather
mysterious Lopez standard."2 Unless the Court applies the congruence and
110. See Frickey, supra note 19, at 726.
111. See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 549.
112, The lower courts have not treated Lopez as an invitation to the revolution. See cases
collected infra note 118 upholding the constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act and infra note 140 discussing the lower court applications of Lopez. Lopez'
vagueness prompted one federal district judge to write:
[A]though the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded the 'outer limits' of
congressional authority, where do those 'outer limits' begin? And while the Lopez
decision indicated that the Court would not sanction 'additional expansion' of
congressional authority, did it also signal a shift in how the Court would approach
what had previously been considered appropriate-or at least constitutional--
congressional regulation? Finally, do congressional findings matter or should a
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proportionality standards to Commerce Clause legislation, Congress can simply
create a record by supplying either boilerplate findings or polemical committee
hearings to justify Commerce Clause legislation." 3 When it comes to
enforcing the Civil War Amendments, however, Boerne suggests that Congress
must build a detailed record to justify its legislation.
Future RFRAs will depend upon the extent of the Court's review of the
legislative record. Future RFRAs under the Section Five power are likely to
fail unless Congress develops some record demonstrating constitutional
violations of religious liberty and crafts legislation aimed at remedying those
violations. 14
court treat them as it would any other argument made in favor of a statute's
constitutionality?
Anismov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N. D. 11. 1997).. See also Regan, supra note 105, at
555 (Commercial/non-commercial distinction "is an unsupported and ill-considered gloss on
an already misguided theory. Justice Kennedy's opinion is an improvement, but it still takes
too much of current thinking for granted."); Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the
Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 801, 818 (1996) (noting the
degree of connection to interstate commerce needed after Lopez is difficult to gauge); Lino A.
Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEx. L. REv.
719, 765-66 (1996) (observing that Lopez may signal an intention to seriously review
Commerce Clause measure but to do so would be a mistake).
113. The Court has revitalized some 10th Amendment limitations on the commerce power
in recent years. See New York v United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). But these decisions only reinforce the point that the Court is
more concerned with formalistic values. Both of these decision are animated by arid federalism
concerns which Justice Kennedy called "etiquette of federalism." See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583,
(Kennedy. J., concurring). New York involved an interstate compact, for example. It seems
excessively formal to declare unconstitutional a regulation that the states themselves asked for
and crafted. In Printz, the Court declared unconstitutional a provision in the Brady handgun.
bill that required local sheriffs to conduct background checks. If taken to its logical extreme,
the Printz decision undermines an enormous amount of contemporary legislation, including
various sections of the civil rights acts. When combined with recent decisions concerning 11 th
Amendment immunity, the Court may be entering an era of "strikingly old fashioned"
jurisprudence. See Frickey, supra note 19, at 729 (citing William N. Eskridge and Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REv. 593, 640 (1992)).
114. This seems unlikely for a number of reasons. First, the Supreme Court may be right
when it said that the modem religious liberty problems do not involve intentional religious
persecutions. Second, if persecution does exist, it may practiced against groups that are not
politically attractive. See Professor Douglas Laycock, Address at the University of Arkansas
at Little Rock, Symposium (Sept. 19 & 20, 1997). For example, politicians may be willing to
champion the cause of religion in general because it resonants with that politician's religiously
mainstream constituents. It may be more difficult to find any political advantage being the
legislative champion for non-mainstream religions. Imagine a politician introducing legislation
to protect live animal sacrifice. Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508




• Narrowly focused RFRAs dealing with commercial subjects may succeed,
however."1 5 Both Boerne and Lopez demand a more searching judicial review
of the congressional record but neither spell out the extent of that review
precisely. Nevertheless, it would be possible to justify a narrowly focused
remedial scheme given the right factual underpinnings. A prudent Congress
could develop a record showing how certain decisions burdening religion affect
interstate commerce. Churches buy goods in interstate commerce or goods that
have moved in interstate commerce. People travel in interstate commerce to
attend church services or participate in church ministries. Restrictive zoning
decisions impede the flow of interstate goods and services. Thus, the many
problems faced by churches in zoning and other land disputes (the very
problem in Boerne) may fall within the commerce power. All of this seems
artificial but no more so than what the lower courts have accepted in Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act cases.' 16
On the other hand, an integrated Boerne/Lopez standard may make courts
more skeptical of such artificial justifications. This may threaten future
Commerce Clause RFRA's and the current FACE statute.'
7
VI. AGNUS DEL: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE FUTURE OF FACE AND RFRA
All of the federal circuit courts to decide the issue have upheld FACE.
They have done so by either 1) ignoring Lopez' distinction between commer-
cial and noncommercial activity, or 2) using an inappropriately deferential
review of the Congressional record purporting to support FACE. "
8
115. But see Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 39, 59 n. 103 (1995) (Commerce
Clause arguments fail to satisfy either internal or external limitations on the power.).
116. See discussion infra note 118.
117. Even if Commerce Clause RFRA's survive Lopez, they may not survive the Court's
revival of federalism limits. This article will not discuss these limits in detail. Suffice it to say
that if the Court follows Justice Kennedy's reasoning from his concurrence in Lopez, it will be
very difficult to justify the kind of federal intrusion into state land use matters. Moreover, New
York and Printz suggest that the federal government may be categorically precluded from
directly regulating states. My purpose in suggesting a Commerce Clause RFRA serves two
purposes. First, it is an ironic statement meant to highlight the harshness of the Court's
rejection of a substantive Section Five power. Boerne places religious liberty in the same
position that racial equality found itself in prior to Heart of Atlanta and McClung. Those cases
used the Commerce Clause to give Congress an important role in protecting equal rights. By
precluding any substantive Section Five power, Boerne returns the focus to the commerce
power. Second, it is meant to show that the conventional justifications for other Commerce
Clause legislation, particularly the FACE statute, apply equally to RFRA. If the Court upholds
FACE but not Commerce Clause RFRA's, it sets up a kind of hierarchy of constitutional rights
where the implied right of abortion receives more protection than the express right of religious
liberty.
118. Federal Circuit Courts: Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir. 1997); United States
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Most decisions upholding FACE have recited the Congressional findings.
These courts have concluded that 1) Congress was regulating a commercial
activity, or 2) Congress was protecting a commercial activity, or 3) that protest
substantially affected interstate commerce. The lower courts have reviewed the
Congressional record which showed acts of violence against abortion clinics.
These courts then concluded that abortion clinics buy goods which moved in
interstate commerce, their patients travel in interstate commerce, clinic doctors
travel across state lines to work in the clinics. Therefore, protest outside
abortion clinics substantially affects interstate commerce.
The Seventh Circuit has upheld FACE in two different cases. These cases
are good examples of the analytical flaws contained in the FACE decisions.
In United States v. Soderna,1" 9 the Court, in an opinion by Chief Judge Posner,
concluded that the act fell within the commerce power. Judge Posner
explained that abortion clinics draw staff, patients and supplies across state
lines and that many protests outside abortion clinics have "succeeded in
curtailing the number and activities of abortion clinics. So this is a statute that
v. Bird, 1997 WL 589684 (5th Cir. 1997); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(noting the legislative record a supports finding of substantial effect); United States v. Sodema,
82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
FACE constitutional because protest affects commerce and Congress can protect interstate
commerce at clinics); American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
FACE is within the commerce power and its remedy is not barred by principles of federalism);
United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11 th Cir.
1995) (distinguishing Lopez on basis of Congressional record supporting FACE and says non-
commercial nature of protest immaterial). Cf Cook v. Reno, 74 F.3d 97 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding district judge improperly considered merits of claim in determining standing issue).
See Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Operation Rescue Versus a Women's Right to
Choose: A Conflict Without a Federal Remedy?, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 709 (1994); Benjamin W.
Roberson, Abortion as Commerce: The Impact of United States v. Lopez on Freedom ofAccess
to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 50 VAND. L. REV. 239 (1997); Steven A. Delchin, Note,
Viewing the Constitutionality of the Access Act Through the Lens of Federalism, 47 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 553 (1997); Arianne K. Tepper, Note and Comment, In Your F.A.C.E: Federal
Law Enforcement of the Freedom ofAccess to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, 17 PACE L. REV.
489 (1997); Lan Hoang, Note, Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S. C. § 248,
20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 128 (1996); Amy H. Nemko, Note, Saving FACE: Clinic Access
Under a New Commerce Clause, 106 YALE L. REV. 525 (1996); Kristine L. Sendek, Comment,
"Face "-ing The Constitution: The Battle Over the Freedom ofAccess to Clinic Entrances Shifts
From Reproductive Health Facilities to the Federal Courts, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 165 (1996);
John M. Scheib, Note, Cheffer v. Reno: Is the Regulation of Abortion Clinic Protests the
Regulation of Interstate Commerce?, 41 VILL. L. REV. 867 (1996); Anna Kampourakis & Robin
C. Tarr, Note, About F.A.C.E. in the Supreme Court: The Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act in Light of Lopez, I I ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 191 (1995); Katherine
Hilber, Note, Constitutional Face-off: Testing the Validity of the Freedom ofAccess to Clinic
Entrances Act, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 143 (1994).
119. 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996).
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really does seek to remove a significant obstruction, in a rather literal sense, to
the free movement of persons and goods across state lines."'
20
The aggregation principle was the applicable test, according to Judge
Posner: "the test was not the effect of the particular conduct alleged, but that
effect cumulated over all the conduct subject to the statute."'' Citing an
antitrust case, Judge Posner concluded that the protest activities outside
abortion clinics affected the interstate market for reproductive health services
at least as much as the boycott of a single ophthalmological surgeon affected
the ophthalmological services market in Los Angeles. 
122
After Lopez, the essential question is whether or not FACE regulates an
economic activity. Most of the courts have concluded that it does because of
the commercial nature of the reproductive health services industry.'23 FACE
does not regulate the clinics; it regulates protest outside clinics, a noncommer-
cial activity. Lopez held that "[w]here economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."' 2 4
Prior Commerce Clause cases did not involve Congressional regulation of a
non-economic activity that affected the economic activity being regulated.
25
Lopez presented this very problem. Gun possession was neither economic
activity nor an activity that "arose out of or [was] connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce."' 26  The Court rejected the government's arguments that gun
possession when aggregated substantially affected the commerce connected to
120. Id. at 1373.
121. Id.
122. See id. Judge Posner cited Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
There is a vast difference between the two, however. First, the conduct in question--an anti-
competitive boycott by the surgeon's competition-is itself economic activity, unlike protest
which does not grow out of or is not connected to any commercial or economic activity.
Second, regulation of such anti-competitive conduct is essential to the success of the broader
program of commercial regulation found in anti-trust law. There is simply no national program
of commercial regulation of the reproductive health services market to which FACE is essential.
Judge Posner's reasoning has no limits. Every activity has the potential to affect interstate
commerce by either increasing its volume or decreasing its volume. Lopez reminds us that
Congress has gone too far under the Commerce Clause when upholding regulation does not
provide any principled limit to congressional power.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 677 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[[]n light of the
national commercial market in abortion-related services recognized by Congress, we hold that
Congress was justified in concluding that the regulation of intrastate activity--the activity
prohibited by the Act-was necessary to ensure the availability (both in terms of access and
price) of abortion services in the national commercial market."); Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520
("Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Access Act does regulate commercial activity, the
provision of reproductive health services.").
124. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
125. See Roberson, supra note 118, at 267.
126. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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education. The aggregation principle applies to economic activity, like
Filbum's wheat farm or Perez' loan sharking. The Lopez court requires more
when the activity being regulated by the statute is not economic. Also, FACE
attempts to regulate activity that is itself not economic, that does not grow out
of economic activity, and that is not essential to the success of a larger program
of commercial regulation."7
In United States v. Wilson,128 the Seventh Circuit found a rational basis for
the Commerce Clause basis of FACE. The Court's opinion conflates the
rational basis standard with the commercial/non-commercial distinction in
Lopez. The Wilson court concluded that courts must decide "whether a rational
basis exists for concluding that a regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce.' 29 It expressly found that the Congressional findings
under FACE were "plainly rational."'130 This ignores Lopez which suggested
that courts should impose a higher level of scrutiny on non-economic
regulation.' 3' Instead, the Seventh Circuit focused on the rationality of the
conclusion that reproductive health services are engaged in interstate
commerce.13 2 That is not the question, however. In Lopez, schools engaged in
interstate commerce in many of the ways that reproductive health clinics do.
Students and teachers cross state lines to attend schools and schools purchase
goods, materials, and services in interstate commerce. Nevertheless, Lopez
says that the focus is not on the school's economic activity but on the activity
of the person being regulated. Congress is not entitled to the traditional
deference accorded to it under rational basis review when it regulates a
127. But see Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 587 (4th Cir. 1997) (FACE regulates activity
that "is closely and directly connected with an economic activity.").
128. 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 680.
130. Seeid. at681.
131. Cf Brickey, supra note 112, at 810-11. Professor Brickey points out that protest
activity outside abortion clinics may have the commercial nexus required by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, she concludes that "non-commercial activity that adversely affects an economic
enterprise engaged in commerce is subject to Commerce Clause jurisdiction." Brickey, supra
note 112, at 811.
132. See Wilson, 73 F.3dat681.
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noncommercial activity. Thus, the Congressional findings under FACE' 33 fail
to distinguish it from Lopez.
The Wilson court acknowledges that it must also examine the means
chosen by Congress to carry out its Commerce Clause goals. 34  Here the
congressional finding that some abortion clinic protests decrease the flow of
interstate commerce might support a Commerce Clause remedy. Nevertheless,
the Court repeats its mistake by again excessively deferring to Congressional
findings. 135 A post- Boerne/Lopez review would require more than acceptance
of Congressional say-so. Instead, the Court must decide whether the chosen
remedy is congruent with the exercise of power and proportional to the extent
of the problem.
At best, the congressional record suggests the need for a law that prohibits
using the instrumentalities of interstate commerce to close clinics, or traveling
in interstate commerce to close clinics, 136 or even engaging in prohibited
conduct with the purpose of harming interstate commerce. 13' FACE is not so
133. The findings were: that reproductive health facilities operate within the stream of
commerce; that individual travel across state lines to work at and seek services from such
facilities; that obstruction of these facilities decreased the overall availability of such services;
and that local governments are not capable of dealing effectively with the problem. See H. R.
Rep. No. 103-306, at 705-07 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699. The first two
findings are essentially the same. Interestingly, the Court abandoned the "stream of commerce"
standard. The fourth finding-local and state inability to deal with the problem-does not
provide a constitutional basis for the exercise of power. The Commerce Clause question does
not turn on whether or not the problem can be characterized as national in scope. Only the
third finding, obstructing commerce, might provide a basis for the exercise of the commerce
power. But that leads to the questions of congruence and proportionality. It cannot justify
wholesale regulation of even local protest. There would be no limit to such a principle.
134. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 680 n.6.
135. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 681 (criticizing the District Court for not deferring to
congressional findings).
136. Cf. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 919-20 ("Congress may protect persons who move in
interstate commerce even though the threat comes from intrastate activity."); Wilson, 73 F.3d
at 680 (holding open the possibility that FACE is constitutional under the "instrumentalities"
category). This would require some interstate nexus as an element of the offense or as a
jurisdictional basis. For example, Congress could make it illegal to travel in interstate
commerce for the purpose of disrupting clinic activities or to disrupt the interstate flow of
people, goods, or services. FACE does not require either.
137. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 408 (1922) (stating
that actions intended to interfere with interstate commerce fall within commerce power).
Deborah Merritt has argued that the notion of fuzzy logic helps explain Lopez. See
Merritt, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 96. She lists several factors that are important to the Lopez
decision.
Among the factors are:
I. The more an activity is like commercial or economic conduct, the more likely it is be
interstate commerce;
2. The less clearly the statute provides a jurisdictional element, the less likely the
regulated activity will be interstate commerce;
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limited. It prohibits even local protest which has no nexus to interstate
commerce save the fact that clinics buy some interstate commerce goods. As
the Wilson district court opinion points out, an integrated economy means that
all of us buy goods that have moved through interstate commerce. 3 If
congruence and proportionality matter, then surely the simple assertion that
there is a national conspiracy does not make it so. There is scant evidence that
every demonstration outside an abortion clinic is a "federal case."'
' 39
3. The less explicitly Congress makes findings tying the regulated activity to
interstate commerce, the less likely it is to be interstate commerce.
4. The more an activity resembles education or another area traditionally regulated
by the states, the less likely it is to be interstate commerce.
See Merritt, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 96.
When she applies them to the FACE statute she does so.in decidedly non-fuzzy fashion,
however. According to Merritt, FACE is constitutional because 1) Congressional power
depends on the effect an activity has on interstate commerce and 2) Congressional findings
demonstrated the interstate connections of health clinics. None of these reasons relate to the
fuzzy principles Merritt developed. Instead, she applies the Commerce Clause precedent in a
very conventional manner. See Merritt, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 96.
Merritt's conventional analysis misses the mark, however. Neither her application of
Lopez or Perez supports her conclusion. Lopez qualified the test so that the question of
substantiality is qualitative and not solely quantitative. In Lopez, the Court suggested that
findings would have helped but it is possible the result would have been the same even with
findings. One possible reading of Lopez then is that Congress cann ot regulate non-commercial
activity squarely within the traditional areas reserved to the states regardless of the effect it may
have on interstate commerce. The Court made a similar statement in Boerne. After reviewing
the congressional findings, the Court said that even with better findings, RFRA exceeded
congressional power because it was not a proper subject for regulation.
The Congressional FACE findings are entirely quantitative. In addition, Merritt focuses
on the clinics, which are not being regulated anymore than education was being regulated in
Lopez. Indeed, there is little doubt, as Merritt herself points out, that gun possession near
schools affects commerce. See Merritt, Fuzzy Logic, supra note 96. Congress's power to
regulate depends in the first instance on whether or not the subject of the regulation comes
within its power, however.
In fact, Merritt's "fuzzy logic" principles themselves do not support FACE's
constitutionality. Protest does not resemble economic activity; the statute does not set out a
jurisdictional connection; and protest (or trespass, assault, and other violent crimes covered by
FACE) are areas traditionally reserved to the states. The congressional findings are the only
fuzzy factor in FACE's favor. As I point out in the text, the findings are not in proportion to
the broad prohibitions in FACE. At worst, FACE's constitutionality is a much closer question
than either Merritt or the federal courts believe.
Merritt says that Congressional power does not depend on the motive or means of
interference with commerce. But if such things did not matter, then there can be no limit to
congressional power. Thus, an additional fuzzy principle emerges: the more that an individual
defendant intends to interfere with interstate commerce and uses means designed to do so, the
more likely it will be within the Commerce Clause.
138. See United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
139. Abortion clinic employees in Little Rock, Arkansas called the police to their facility
because they feared a disruptive protest was about to begin. When the police arrived they found
two Discalced Carmelite nuns standing next to their car. The nuns, who live in cloister, were
making a visit to their physician when their car broke down in front of the abortion clinic. The
RFRA
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It can be argued that Perez allows Congress to dispense with proof of an
interstate nexus in every case. In Perez, however, the commercial industry
being regulated, interstate banking, was substantially affected by the illegal
commerce of loan sharking. Individual loan sharks were generally connected
to illegal crime. Thus, dispensing with proof in individual cases allowed
prosecutors to get at soldiers in the organized crime family. Even if the
individual loan sharks were not connected to and did not engage in any
interstate commerce they were still within Congressional power under
Wickard's aggregation principle. The individual loan sharks were exactly like
Roscoe Filbum, the farmer in Wickard: they were taking money and customers
out of the interstate commerce market by engaging in a competing transaction.
This money overhung the market in ways similar to the wheat for home
consumption. In FACE, there is no competing commercial transaction.
Thus, a principled Lopez/Boerne application calls for less deference to the
congressional findings in FACE cases. Courts must more carefully inspect the
record for the actual purposes behind FACE and then measure the scope of the
remedy against these reasons. I suggest that this will result in striking down the
broad FACE purview in favor of a narrower focus on the actual interstate
commerce involvement. Only then would the remedy be congruent and
proportional to the need for the statute.
If the Supreme Court approves the lower courts' approach to FACE, then
a Commerce Clause RFRA may survive a constitutional challenge. The
deferential review and the facial characterization of the regulated activity as
economic will help a Commerce Clause RFRA satisfy the internal requirements
of the Commerce Clause.' 40 It may also help it satisfy the external federalism
nuns got out to inspect their car. They were completely unaware of their location. An
employee of the clinic saw the nuns standing outside the clinic and jumped to the conclusion
that they were the first wave of a blockade. She then called the police. See ARKANSAS
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, May 15, 1997, at IA.
This does not minimize the very real dangers presented by violent protest. My argument
here is not that Congress can never regulate activities outside abortion clinics. Rather, I argue
that Congress must tailor the regulation to conform to the nature of the power being exercised
and in proportion to the scope of the problem.
140. Lopez has not wrought a thorough judicial revolution. In fact, lower courts have
interpreted Lopez very narrowly, as is clear from the discussion in the text concerning FACE.
Deference to Congressional findings and the willingness to find commerce almost everywhere
characterize the lower courts' approach. This has resulted in a number of well-known statutes
being upheld.
Drug Free School Zones Act: see United States v. Jackson, 111 F. 3d 101 (11 th Cir.
1997); United States v. Ehrlich, 106 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion); United
States v. Hawkins, 104 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Ekinci, 101 F.3d. 838 (2d
Cir. 1996); United States v. McKinney, 98 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1119 (1997); United States v. Orozco, 98 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Zorrilla, 93
F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135 (6th Cir. 1996).
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limits as well. FACE amounts to a serious infringement on personal liberty
without local accountability by imposing the power of the Federal government
directly on individuals. A Commerce Clause RFRA would not invade
individual liberty to the same extent. Instead, it would set a standard for local
officials to follow, leaving the ultimate decisions to these same local officials.
In any event, upholding FACE against federalism challenges while striking
down Commerce Clause RFRAs would be ironic. Both statutes attempt to
reconcile competing needs, rights, and values. A mechanical acceptance of
FACE coupled with a rejection of RFRA would establish a hierarchy in which
some rights are more equal than others.
VII. LIBERA ME: PARITY FOR SECTION FIVE AND THE COMMERCE POWER
If the Courts do not integrate these two cases into a unified standard, it
will appear to prefer values that are "formalist rather than humanitarian [and]
selectively counter-majoritarian."'' 4  The Court is not willing to invest
Congress with the expansive power to expand and protect human rights
suggested by Morgan and predicted by Archibald Cox. Integrating the Boerne
and Lopez standards will at least put Section Five and the commerce powers on
the same footing. It will also preserve some modest role for Congress to play
in expanding the protection of human rights.
Violence Against Women Act: see United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758 (4th Cir. 1997);
Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. I1l. 1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188
(E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997); United States v.
Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. N.Y. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
But see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996)
(holding Violence Against Women Act exceeds Congressional authority).
Carjacking: see, e.g., United States v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995); United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 992 (1997); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995).
141. Frickey, supra note 19, at 729.
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